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Courts Should Not Adopt Strict Scrutiny for
Firearm Regulations
“[I]n 2012, the number of AR- and AK-style weapons
manufactured and imported into the United States was more than
double the number of Ford F–150 trucks sold, the most commonly
sold vehicle in the United States.”1
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the Second Amendment’s guarantee of
the right “of the people to keep and bear Arms” is the subject of
much controversy.2 Until recently, a longstanding question was
whether the Second Amendment protects an individual’s private
right to bear arms outside the context of the maintenance of a
militia.3 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed the individual right to bear arms,
holding that the District of Columbia’s legislative ban on
handgun possession in the home violated the Second
Amendment.4 Central to this holding was an emphasis on self-
defense and the right of law-abiding citizens to use a handgun
“in defense of hearth and home.”5 The Court stressed that the
right to bear arms “is not unlimited,”6 but declined to define a
1 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in
part en banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
2 Compare David French, Of Course the Second Amendment Protects and
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 13, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/433993/second-amendment-protects-individual-right-keep-
bear-arms [https://perma.cc/V4PB-C8LA] (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II), with Dorothy
Samuels,The SecondAmendmentWasNeverMeant to Protect an Individual’s Right to aGun:
How the Supreme Court upended the well-established meaning of the Second Amendment,
THE NATION (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-roberts-court-
undermined-sensible-gun-control/ [https://perma.cc/ZSC7-Y7WF].
3 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636–37 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The
Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 718–22 (2006).
4 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (2008).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 626.
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standard of review for challenges to firearm regulations,
suggesting that the District’s legislative ban would fail under
any level of scrutiny that has been applied to enumerated
constitutional rights.7
When the Heller decision was announced, then-
Republican nominee for President, Senator John McCain,
praised the decision and argued that Chicago and other
municipalities’ bans on handguns infringed on constitutional
rights.8 Then-Democratic Presidential nominee, Senator Barack
Obama, hailed the ruling as the first clear statement on the Second
Amendment in 127 years but also qualified that, “what works in
Chicago may not work in Cheyenne.”9 Heller created a division of
opinion in President George W. Bush’s administration, with Vice
President Dick Cheney applauding the decision and other
administration officials fearing the unraveling of a wide range of
gun regulations, including a federal law on machine guns.10
By declining to adopt or define the standard of review the
Court was employing, or how future challenges to firearm
regulations should be resolved, the Heller decision opened the
floodgates for legal challenges to firearm regulations across the
nation.11 For example, following Heller the National Rifle
Association (NRA) signaled almost immediately that it would file
“lawsuits in San Francisco, Chicago and several of its suburbs.”12
In failing to expressly adopt a standard of review, but
suggesting that the District’s law would fail under any level of
scrutiny, the Court in Heller was implementing some form of
heightened review by implying that rational basis was not an
option.13 This is important because the standard of review a
court employs influences the outcome of a court’s decision. When
a court reviews whether a legislative act is constitutional, a
strict scrutiny standard of review requires the government to
prove its restriction is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest,” while intermediate scrutiny requires the
government to “demonstrate . . . a reasonable fit between the
challenged regulation and a substantial government
7 Id. at 628–29.
8 See Dina Temple-Raston, Supreme Court: Individuals Have Right to Bear
Arms, NPR (June 26, 2008, 10:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=91911807 [https://perma.cc/ATN8-8QWT].
9 See id (quoting statement of Barack Obama).
10 See id.
11 Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12 Temple-Raston, supra note 8.
13 See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–82 (4th Cir. 2010); see also
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010).
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objective.”14 As the least demanding level, rational basis
requires a law to have some “conceivable valid function” to
withstand constitutional scrutiny.15
The Court’s decision led many to predict chaos and
confusion in the wake of Heller over future gun regulations.16
Indeed, courts have continually grappled with the issue of an
appropriate standard of review for a wide range of legislation
regulating firearms.17 The Court’s failure to provide a standard of
review, andHeller’s acknowledgement of an ill-defined set of lawful
regulatory measures—such as the “longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings”18—prohibits citizens and
legislators from knowing under what standard firearm regulations
will be reviewed moving forward, and what regulations are
permissible under the Heller holding.19 This lack of guidance is
important because theHeller decision pronounced the individual
right to a handgun for self-defense as a fundamental right, but
the Supreme Court has not clarified the appropriate standard of
review that should accompany this core constitutional right.20
Following Heller, many courts reacted by applying
intermediate scrutiny to challenges pertaining to firearm
regulations.21 This default is not only because of Heller’s
implication that rational basis was not appropriate,22 but also
because of the evolving stage of Second Amendment doctrine
under judicial review.23 Particularly, the scope of the types of
weapons protected under the Second Amendment and its
14 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 179 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (2010); Chester, 628 F.3d, 683), aff’d in part, vacated in part en
banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
15 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99).
16 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 923 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); see generally Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, Colloquy Debate,
McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011).
17 See Joe Palazzolo, Federal Appeals Court to Hear Two Cases Challenging
D.C. Gun Law: Living in a High-Crime Neighborhood Isn’t Reason Enough to Carry a
Concealed Gun, Washington Police Say, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 17, 2016), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/federal-appeals-court-to-hear-two-cases-challenging-d-c-gun-law-
1474104606 [https://perma.cc/7HQQ-LCWQ].
18 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
19 Id. at 679–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see alsoUnited States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010).
20 See New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254
(2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Shew v. Malloy, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016).
21 See Chester, 628 F.3d at 682–83; United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85,
97 (3rd Cir. 2010) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008)).
22 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 651 (7th Cir. 2010).
23 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99–101.
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purpose are not completely settled.24 In his closing words in the
Heller decision, Justice Antonin Scalia hinted at a loose set of
exceptions for firearm regulations that would be addressed if they
came before the Court.25 While an individual’s right to bear arms
in defense of “hearth and home”26 is now deemed a fundamental
right,27 “strict scrutiny does not apply automatically” every time a
constitutionally enumerated right is concerned.28
Despite the hesitancy of many courts to apply even a
heightened form of review, in Kolbe v. Hogan the Fourth Circuit
remanded a case involving Maryland’s Firearm Safety Act
(FSA), instructing the lower court to apply strict scrutiny in its
review.29 By banning the possession or purchase of all assault
weapons, the panel found that the FSA implicated a “core
protection of the Second Amendment—‘the right of law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home’”30—and became the first court to explicitly adopt strict
scrutiny in reviewing legislation regulating firearms.31 In
departing from other circuit courts of appeals and elevating
firearm regulations to the highest echelon of judicial review
recognized by U.S. courts,32 the Fourth Circuit subjected the
rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment—whatever their
scope may be33—to much more “robust judicial protection.”34
This use of strict scrutiny proved to be short-lived,
however, as just one year after its initial ruling in a significant
turn of events, the Fourth Circuit released an en banc decision35
vacating the appellate court panel opinion.36 The en banc
decision not only rejected strict scrutiny as the appropriate
standard of review, but also stated that the assault weapons at
issue in Kolbe were beyond the scope of the Heller decision
altogether, and therefore not protected under the Second
Amendment.37 Even if the assault weapons fell under Second
24 Chester, 628 F.3d at 676.
25 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
26 Id.
27 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
28 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96.
29 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in
part en banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
30 Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635).
31 Id. at 182.
32 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96.
33 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–26 (2008).
34 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 784–85, 879 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
35 En banc means a decision by all judges of the circuit, rather than a select
panel of judges from that circuit. En Banc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
36 See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
37 Id. at 121.
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Amendment protection, the en banc decision noted, the
regulation would be subject to intermediate scrutiny and would
satisfy that standard of review.38 This marks a dramatic
development in Second Amendment jurisprudence, revealing
courts’ difficulties in addressing firearm regulations absent a
defined standard of review.
Since Heller expressed limitations and exceptions
without clearly defining them,39 it is uncertain what the Second
Amendment protects, nor is it clear whether these exceptions
fall under a uniform standard of review or are subject to more
individualized treatment.40 Compounding this issue is the
difficulty in determining what will withstand constitutional
evaluation in the context of firearm regulations under a strict
scrutiny standard of review.41 The en banc decision in Kolbe
addressed some of these open questions,42 but went a step
further by declaring the assault weapons at issue to be weapons
of war, beyond the scope of the Heller decision, and therefore
outside the reach of Second Amendment protection.43
The Fourth Circuit’s embrace and subsequent rejection of
strict scrutiny,44 in connection with the vastly different ruling of
the en banc decision declaring assault weapons to be beyond
Second Amendment protection, exhibits why other courts should
not employ a strict scrutiny analysis when evaluating firearm
regulations. A more flexible standard of review is needed and
other courts should not follow the Fourth Circuit’s experiment
with strict scrutiny for two reasons. First, because the Supreme
Court declined to explicitly adopt strict scrutiny, lower courts
should not take this initiative on their own because of the
potential for a circuit split.45 Such adoption would create greater
38 Id.
39 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
40 See Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009)
(discussing the assumption of Heller’s exceptions as valid law and the implications for
future gun regulations).
41 Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
42 Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135–36 (4th Cir. 2017).
43 Id. at 135.
44 Id. at 121.
45 See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff ’ s Dep’t., 775 F.3d 308, 311–12, 328–
29 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute that prohibited individuals who
had been committed to mental institutions from possessing firearms); United States v.
Armstrong, III, 706 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2013), vacated, Armstrong, III, v. United States,
134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (discussing, but not explicitly adopting, strict scrutiny for firearm
regulations); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012) (comparing different levels of scrutiny for
various legislation regulating firearms and indicating that strict scrutiny applies to some
handgun regulations); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding
that “a categorical ban on gun ownership by a class of individuals must be supported by
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confusion over Second Amendment jurisprudence while it is still
not clear what rights are protected. Second, because the scope and
potential exceptions to Second Amendment protections are not
settled, a more flexible standard of review—higher than rational
basis, but lower than strict scrutiny—is better suited to
accommodate challenges to firearm regulations in relation to
states’ rationales for those regulations. Similar to how commercial
speech is permissibly subject to greater restrictions than individual
speech in the First Amendment context,46 strict scrutiny should not
be uniformly applied to potentially varying degrees of lawful
behavior under the Second Amendment. While the boundaries of
what the Second Amendment protects remain ambiguous, courts
should refrain from adopting strict scrutiny and employ
intermediate scrutiny, weighing the justifications for the legislation
at hand against the burdens imposed on lawful gun ownership.
This note examines the relationship between the right to
bear arms as an individual right, the ongoing debate over
firearm regulations in society as a whole, and the appropriate
standard of review courts should utilize in addressing legislation
that impacts Second Amendment rights. Part I explores the
background of District of Columbia v. Heller, its application to
individual states via the Fourteenth Amendment following
McDonald v. City of Chicago, and the exceptions and limitations
left open by these decisions in an effort to formulate a rule
dictating the scope of the Second Amendment under current U.S.
jurisprudence and the ambiguous language of the Second
Amendment. Part II confronts the circuit courts’ approaches to
firearm regulations, including the Fourth Circuit’s departure
from other courts of appeals with its premature adoption and
ultimate rejection of strict scrutiny. Part III discusses what
qualifies for Second Amendment protection, and that
specifically, the individual right to a gun is limited to the home
for self-defense. This Part provides a solution to the open-ended
language of the Second Amendment offering that, until the
Supreme Court clearly defines the rights under the Second
Amendment, courts should adhere to intermediate scrutiny in
evaluating challenges to firearm regulations.
some form of ‘strong showing,’ necessitating a substantial relationship between the
restriction and an important governmental objective.” (quoting and citing United States
v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010)).
46 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010).
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I. BACKGROUND ONHELLER ANDMCDONALD: EXCEPTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS
An understanding of the background of Heller is crucial
in assessing why circuit courts are struggling to apply its holding
to challenges to firearm regulations. In Heller, the Supreme
Court enumerated exceptions and limitations of the right to bear
arms, but the majority’s vague language left circuit courts
guessing as to the scope of those exceptions. Importantly, the
Court explicitly refused to state what level of scrutiny lower
courts should apply to firearm regulations.47
A. An Individual Right to Bear Arms
The question presented in Heller was “whether [the]
District of Columbia[’s] prohibition on the possession of usable
handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment”48 and,
in a controversial decision,49 the Court announced that it did.50
The D.C. law at issue banned handgun possession in the home
and required any lawful firearm in a home to be “disassembled
or bound by trigger lock.”51 By making it illegal to carry
unregistered firearms while also prohibiting the registration of
handguns,52 the D.C. law effectively banned all handguns.53
As a special officer at the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary
Building in D.C., respondent Dick Heller was certified to carry a
handgun at work, but was refused permission by the city when
he applied to register a handgun that he sought to keep at
home.54 Challenging the law as a violation of his Second
Amendment rights to keep and bear arms, Heller sought to
prevent the city from enforcing the registration and license
requirements of handguns, as well as the trigger-lock constraint
because it rendered firearms in the home inoperable.55 The
district court dismissed the suit, but the Court of Appeals for the
47 See supra notes 3, 6–7 and accompanying text.
48 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573 (2008).
49 District of Columbia v. Heller: One of the Supreme Court’s most important
Second Amendment decisions, PARENTS AGAINSTGUN VIOLENCE (Feb. 15, 2013), http://
www.parentsagainstgunviolence.com/district-of-columbia-v-heller-one-of-the-supre
me-courts-most-important-second-amendment-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/WF77-AE88]
(discussing the implications of Heller for gun control and ownership and the 5–4
split in the decision).
50 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
51 D.C. Code Ann. §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 7-2507.02 (West 2001).
52 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.
53 Id. at 628.
54 Id. at 575.
55 Id. at 575–76.
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District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms in
the home.56 Because the regulations served as a total ban on
handguns, the D.C. Circuit held that it violated this right.57
A critical component of the Supreme Court’s Heller
decision was the focus on handguns in the context of overall
firearm ownership.58 The Washington Times posted a list of the
best guns for home protection, which revealed that nineteen out
of the top twenty-one guns are handguns.59 This list bolsters the
Court’s assertion that “handguns are the most popular weapon
chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home,”60 and at the
very least, acknowledges that handguns are a weapon of choice
for self-defense.
In affirming the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, the Supreme
Court emphasized self-defense as a core right of the Second
Amendment, and possession of a handgun in the home as an
essential element of this right.61 While the Court also suggested
a limitation that the right does not pertain to “any sort of
confrontation,”62 it made clear that any limitation cannot inhibit
this fundamental right by stating, “whatever else it leaves to
future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of
hearth and home.”63 The Court’s emphasis on the individual right
of self-defense and possession of a handgun heightens the
significance of the right to bear arms as a whole, possibly requiring
a higher level of constitutional scrutiny.64 By further personalizing
the right to bear arms as fundamental “to ‘keep’ and use
for protection of one’s home and family,”65 the majority decision
indicated the prospect that firearm regulations required an
elevated standard of review, closer to strict scrutiny.66
56 Id. at 576.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 629.
59 21 best guns for home protection, WASH. TIMES, http://www.washington
times.com/multimedia/collection/21-best-guns-home-protection/ [https://perma.cc/PD8B-
9AR6].
60 Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
61 Id. at 629–30.
62 Id. at 595 (emphasis omitted).
63 Id. at 635.
64 See Jonathan Zimmer, Regulation Reloaded: The Administrative Law of
Firearms After District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 189, 220–21 (2010).
65 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d
370, 400 (2007)).
66 Zimmer, supra note 64, at 200–01 (discussing that gun regulators should
assume strict scrutiny will be the standard of review but how that does not mean
challenged laws will always be struck down).
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Broadening this discussion in reference to the role of the
judiciary, the Court stated that “[a] constitutional guarantee
subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no
constitutional guarantee at all” and that, “[c]onstitutional rights
are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when
the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes)
even future judges think that scope too broad.”67 Despite this
emphasis on the constitutional guarantee of the right, and the
insulation from judicial interpretation meant by such a guarantee,
the Court declined to explicitly adopt strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for firearm regulations, finding
that the D.C. regulations would fail under any level of scrutiny.68
The majority decision provoked a fiery dissent from
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, who was joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg.69 Incorporating the majority decision’s
notion that the individual right to bear arms is not absolute, the
dissent highlighted various historical examples of firearm
regulations, including those that restricted the use of firearms
in the home for self-defense.70 In connecting this to the D.C. law
at issue, Justice Breyer argued that it was an appropriate
legislative response to the acknowledged social problem of
overwhelming gun violence.71 In expanding on the idea that
Second Amendment rights are not absolute, he proposed that this
notion in itself subjects the right to government regulation,72 and
that the real question regarding firearm regulations is “whether
the statute imposes burdens that, when viewed in the light of the
statute’s legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”73 While this
interest-balancing test could seem nebulous,74 theHellermajority’s
approval of a lawful set of regulatory measures75 complicates any
attempt to apply strict scrutiny as it is not certain how these lawful
regulatorymeasures would withstand constitutional inquiry under
such a demanding standard of review.76
67 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
68 Id. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied
to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm
in the nation to “keep” and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail
constitutional muster.” (quoting Parker, 478 F.3d at 400)).
69 Id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 683 (explaining how the three the largest cities during the colonial
period—Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City—restricted the use of firearms within
city limits).
71 Id. at 682.
72 Id. at 683.
73 Id. at 694 (citation omitted).
74 Temple-Raston, supra note 8.
75 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (discussing prohibitions on concealed weapons,
felons, the mentally ill, etc.).
76 Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The District passed the law at issue in Heller with the
purpose of promoting public safety by targeting unregistered
firearms.77 The legislature viewed the law as a way to bolster the
ability of the Metropolitan Police Department to promote public
safety in a region of high urban and government concentration.78
The legislature considered it to be an effective means to reduce
gun-related crimes and deaths, and Justice Breyer augmented
this purpose, noting the discrepancy that for every intruder
stopped by a homeowner with a firearm, there are four gun
related accidents within the home.79 In fact, statistics show that
“[t]he notion that a good guy with a gun will stop a bad guy with
a gun is a romanticized vision of the nature of violent crime.”80
For example, in a five-year study conducted by the Violence
Policy Center, there was “one justifiable killing for every thirty-
twomurders, suicides, or accidental deaths.”81 In concluding that
D.C.’s interest was compelling, Justice Breyer emphasized that
it is legislators, not judges, who have the chief responsibility in
acting on policy conclusions,82 and ultimately an interest-
balancing approach of weighing the needs and burdens is what
justified the statute.83 In this way, the law did not
“disproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests.”84
In a separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens
expounded on how the Court’s decision that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms provided
no guidance as to “the scope of that right.”85 Furthermore, the
lack of a clearly defined scope of the individual right to bear arms
reserves for future cases the challenge of actually outlining that
scope and the boundaries of a permissible regulation.86 And
while the Heller decision made it clear that law-abiding citizens
have the right to a gun in the home, it did not provide guidance
for how state legislatures can regulate gun ownership beyond
77 Firearm Control Regulations Act of 1975: Hearing on H. Con. R. 694 Before
the H. Comm. on the District of Columbia, 9th Cong. 7 (1976).
78 See Edward D. Jones, III, The District of Columbia’s “Firearm Control
Regulations Act of 1975”: The Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States—Or
Is It?, 455 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.: GUN CONTROL 138, 142 (1981).
79 Heller, 554 U.S. at 693–94 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Firearms Control
Regulations Act of 1975: Hearing and Disposition before the H. Comm. on the District of
Columbia, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. on H. Con. Res. 694, Ser. No. 94-24 at 25 (1976).
80 Scott Martelle, Gun and self-defense statistics that might surprise you—and
the NRA, L.A. TIMES, (June 19, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-
guns-self-defense-charleston-20150619-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y9ET-Z2ZT].
81 Id.
82 Heller, 554 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 710–11.
84 Id. at 714–23 (emphasis in original).
85 Id. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 679.
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the scope of that immediate right, or even what type of guns are
protected under the Second Amendment.87 Highlighting the
impact of the Heller decision on future cases, and echoing
Breyer’s concerns over permissible legislation, Stevens stated
that “[u]ntil today, it has been understood that legislatures may
regulate civilian use and misuse of firearms so long as they do
not interfere with the preservation of a well-regulated militia.”88
In confronting Justice Scalia’s fear of judicial discretion in
addressing challenges to enumerated rights,89 Stevens predicted
that, in light of the Heller decision, legislatures would face
limited policy choices and that would ultimately result in a much
more active judicial role in making policy decisions.90
Without guidance on a standard of review, there is
greater potential for lower courts to interpret Heller in vastly
different ways, and legislatures will be forced to draft policies in
the uncertain shadows of what is and is not permissible under
the Heller holding.91 Indeed, this is exactly what has happened
in Heller’s wake as the circuits struggle to interpret and apply
the decision to new firearm regulations.
B. What Is the Standard and What Does It Protect?
TheHeller Court’s failure to provide a standard of review
compounds the difficulty in knowing what regulations are
permissible and what is protected by the Second Amendment.
Should regulations burdening the core right of self-defense in
the home be subject to strict scrutiny while restrictions outside
of that core right receive intermediate scrutiny because they
impact other interests such as public safety?92 Justice Breyer
reasoned that in the context of firearm regulations, “true strict-
scrutiny” would be impossible for legislation to survive because
nearly all gun-control measures attempt to promote public
safety, and historically, the Court has found numerous occasions
where public safety concerns justify restrictions on individual
liberties.93 This presents a perpetual problem because there is
an inherent tension between promoting public safety through
87 See Temple-Raston, supra note 8.
88 Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 634–35 (majority opinion).
90 Id. at 679–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 See Ian W. Henderson, Rights, Regulations, and Revolvers: Baltimore City’s
Complex Constitutional Challenge Following District of Columbia v. Heller, 39 U. BALT.
L. REV. 423, 446 (2010).
92 See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller
and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1165 (2011).
93 Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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firearm regulations and the duty of legislators to protect the
individual right to a gun.94
An important component to this lack of a standard of
review is what actually is being discussed and what is truly
protected under the Second Amendment. The Heller Court
espoused the individual right to bear arms, and forcefully stated
that the D.C. statute banning handgun possession in the home
and its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the
home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense,
violated the Second Amendment.95 This right is not for “any sort
of confrontation,”96 but does that mean the individual right only
applies to the home? Or for self-defense? It is important not to
dismiss the existence and justifications of the constitutional right
to bear arms,97 but what is more difficult to assess is the extent to
which Second Amendment protections apply, especially when the
Court stated it would address exceptions to the Second
Amendment “if and when those exceptions come before us.”98
The Court still has not explained the exceptions inHeller,
and it is unclear the degree to which a weapon is “in common use
at the time,”99 what is “dangerous and unusual,”100 and what
confrontations and purposes are protected under the Second
Amendment.101 Further clarity is needed to determine what
defines these exceptions and when they should be applied in
order to inform the general public of what rights are protected
under the Second Amendment.
While the clarity of such exceptions is limited in Heller,
the Court did state that, “nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings.”102 The Court may have had reasons for
not explicitly clarifying the boundaries of these exceptions, but
courts evaluating post-Heller cases are left with the burden of
having to address them.103
94 See Zimmer, supra note 64, at 220.
95 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
96 Id. at 595 (emphasis omitted).
97 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 331 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed.
2000) (“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”).
98 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
99 Id. at 624.
100 Id. at 627 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE 148–49 (1769)).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 626–27.
103 Id. at 635–36; see generally Larson, supra note 40, at 1372 (discussing that the
Heller exceptions will ultimately have to be justified under some standard of scrutiny).
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Although Justice Scalia emphasized that the
“enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain
policy choices off the table,”104 the debate between blanket bans
on firearms and reasonable regulation requires legislatures to
engage in a policy discussion.105 The disconnect between the
majority and dissents in the Heller decision highlight the
controversial nature of discussions regarding Second
Amendment rights, and the debate over how legislatures make
policy determinations consistent with the guarantees of the
Second Amendment. The jurisprudential result is one of
confusion, with some advocating that the “right shall not be
infringed” in anyway, and others purporting to read a form of
heightened scrutiny into Heller’s decision.106
By failing to define a standard of review and creating a
loose set of exceptions to the rights protected by the Second
Amendment, the Heller decision requires the Supreme Court to
further direct the course of Second Amendment jurisprudence.107
This is especially true in light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Kolbe, where that court chose to apply strict scrutiny to the
FSA,108 and in a subsequent en banc opinion, rejected not only
that standard of review, but even the notion that assault
weapons are constitutionally protected.109 This is important not
only for the guidance of lower courts and legislators, but also to
keep the general public informed of their rights under the
Second Amendment.110 Because these rights are not clear, and
until the Supreme Court provides guidance as to what is and is
not protected by the Second Amendment, courts should apply
intermediate scrutiny.
C. An Individual Right to Bear Arms: Application to the
States
Within two years of the Heller decision, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to the states.111
In consideration of the Court’s rulings that many of the Bill of
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
105 Id. at 702–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106 Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
What Hath Heller Wrought?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1143, 1183 (2015).
107 Id.
108 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in
part en banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
109 Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 121.
110 See Charles, supra note 106, at 1143–45.
111 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).
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Right’s provisions apply to both the Federal government and
the states, the Court in McDonald held that the Second
Amendment right of an individual to possess a gun is fully
applicable to the states.112
Joined by the National Rifle Association (NRA)113 and
multiple individuals, plaintiff Otis McDonald challenged the
City of Chicago’s ordinance which required a registration
certificate for firearms but also prohibited the registration of
most handguns.114 In the same suit, plaintiffs also challenged an
additional ordinance from the nearby city of Oak Park, Illinois,
which made it illegal to keep any firearm such as a pistol,
revolver, or small arm (essentially all handguns).115 Plaintiffs
argued that they had the right to a handgun in the home for
protection and that this right was being denied because the
ordinances required them to store their firearms outside of the
cities’ limits.116
The Chicago City Council passed its ordinance “to protect
[its] residents . . . from the loss of property and injury or death
from firearms.”117 The district court dismissed the suit citing to
Seventh Circuit precedent upholding such bans,118 and the
Seventh Circuit affirmed, refusing to incorporate and apply to
the states the Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.119 In
reversing, the Supreme Court stressed the “paucity of precedent
sustaining bans comparable to those at issue here and inHeller,”
stating that incorporation of the Second Amendment to the
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would not endanger every law regulating firearms across the
country.120 The Court contended that the decision would have no
112 Id.
113 The National Rifle Association is a group that represents firearm advocates,
and through its tax-exempt affiliate, the NRA Foundation, provides financial and
political support for promoting Second Amendment protection for firearm-related
activities. A Brief History of the NRA, NRA, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra/ [https://
perma.cc/6MPZ-PKVA].
114 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750–52.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 751–52.
117 CITY COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF CHI., ILL. JOURNAL, Regular Meeting—
Friday, March 19, 1982, at 10049 (1982), http://chicityclerk.com/legislation-records/
journals-and-reports/journals-proceedings [https://perma.cc/4NHB-KXZM].
118 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Oak Park, 617 F.Supp.2d 752, 753–54
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Quilici v. Vill. Of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982)),
aff’d 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d McDonald, 561 U.S. 742.
119 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America, Inc., 567 F.3d at 857–58.
120 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 742, 786.
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inhibitory impact on state and local experimentation with
reasonable firearm regulations.121
In fact, the Court characterized themunicipal respondents
as being “at war with [the] central holding in Heller,” and that in
effect, respondents were requesting the right acknowledged in
Heller to be a “second-class right, subject to an entirely different
body of rules than other Bill of Rights guarantees.”122 In connecting
the individual right to bear arms as a fundamental right, the Court
emphasized that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
considered the right to bear arms as fundamental, deeply rooted in
history, and connected to an ordered scheme of liberty.123
Deeming the right fundamental does not mean strict
scrutiny should apply,124 and compounding the issue is the fact
that strict scrutiny is not always applied as rigidly under
considerations of Due Process.125 While the majority decision in
McDonald reiterated a rejection of interest-balancing as
proposed by Justice Breyer in his dissent inHeller,126 the dissent
in McDonald poignantly addressed the fact that the Court was
still not explaining theHeller rights’ “precise contours . . . under
[any] standard of review.”127 Moreover, because Heller based an
understanding of the rights under the Second Amendment as
fundamental due to the right to private self-defense of the
home,128 the implications on regulations beyond the home are not
exactly clear.129
While the Court aspired to an objective method regarding
Second Amendment rights concerns, by dismissing an interest-
balancing test and failing to provide a standard of review for the
already ambiguous scope of the Second Amendment, “[t]here is
no objective, neutral answer to [any of] these questions”
regarding the potential future implications of firearm
regulations.130 In instituting a national individual right to a
firearm absent a specified level of scrutiny or interest-balancing
test, the Court invited a “tsunami of legal uncertainty, and thus
121 Id. at 785–86.
122 Id. at 780.
123 Id. at 776–78.
124 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 96 (3rd Cir. 2010); see
generally Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227 (2006).
125 See Stacy L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court
Supposed to Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 496 (2015).
126 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785–86 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 633–35 (2008)); Heller, 554 U.S. at 694 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 904 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128 Heller, 554 U.S. at 633–35.
129 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 911 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 906.
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litigation,” by not clearly defining the scope of the right.131
Because the Supreme Court failed in its McDonald decision to
clarify the extent of Second Amendment protections provided in
Heller, courts should not adopt strict scrutiny for firearm
regulations, and the democratic process in creating reasonable
regulations for firearms in the context of public safety should be
a guide for judicial discretion.132
II. POST-HELLER&MCDONALD: STANDARDS OF REVIEW&
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’SDEPARTURE
Several circuit courts have used different approaches to
evaluate firearm regulations. Notably, the Fourth Circuit departed
from other circuit courts of appeals with its adoption of strict
scrutiny. This Part explores circuit courts’ approaches to firearm
regulations and addresses the premature implementation of strict
scrutiny due to the fact that much of the Second Amendment still
remains open-ended in terms of what it actually protects.
A. A Two-Pronged Approach
The day after McDonald was decided, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued its decision inUnited
States v. Marzzarella,133 instituting a two-pronged approach to
assessing firearm regulations, and providing an opportune
example of a regulation not specifically addressed in Heller.134
Defendant, Michael Marzzarella, was convicted of possessing a
stolen handgun with an erased serial number in violation of
federal law outlawing the sale, transfer, or possession of
firearms with removed, altered, or erased serial numbers.135 In
affirming Marzzarella’s conviction, the Third Circuit held that
the Second Amendment does not protect the right to possess a
handgun with a removed serial number, even for self-defense in
the home.136
As a regulation not mentioned in Heller, challengers to
firearm laws can potentially make a strong argument that the
right to bear arms in defense of “hearth and home”137 should turn
on functionality, and the fact that a gun has an erased, or
partially removed, serial number should not disconnect it from
131 Id. at 887 (footnote omitted).
132 See id. at 880.
133 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3rd Cir. 2010).
134 Id. at 93.
135 Id. at 87–88 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(k)).
136 Id.
137 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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Heller’s individual right to a gun in the home for self-defense.138
After all, “[w]ith or without a serial number, a pistol is still a
pistol . . . [but] [b]y this rationale, any type of firearm possessed
in the home would be protected merely because it could be used
for self-defense.”139 Further, the sorts of “dangerous and unusual
weapons”140 rejected as being protected by the Second
Amendment in Heller could be protected under this type of
reasoning.141 The Marzarrella court quickly dismissed the
contention that because guns in common use in 1791 did not
possess serial numbers, Marzzarella’s right to a handgun with a
removed serial number was constitutionally protected.142 The
court, however, considered the argument that Marzzarella’s
interest in defense of home was implicated, and had to reconcile
this interest with a firearm that could be deemed dangerous and
unusual because it had an erased serial number.143
In addressing this quandary, the Marzzarella court
instituted a two-part test for firearm regulations:
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee . . . If
it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law
under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster
under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.144
With this framework for analysis, the Third Circuit found
that the challenged lawmet the first part of the test by implicating
self-defense, and approached the second question of what standard
of review courts should apply regarding firearm regulations.145
Speedily rejecting rational basis as being contrary to
Heller’s holding, the court responded to Marzzarella’s contention
that strict scrutiny should apply by pointing to the range of
potential Second Amendment challenges, and the fact that strict
scrutiny may not be appropriately applied to any given
situation.146 In distinguishing the present case from Heller, the
court noted that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban in
Heller “[was] an example of a law at the far end of the spectrum
of infringement on protected Second Amendment rights.”147
138 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93–94.
139 Id. at 94.
140 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE 148–49 (1769)).
141 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94–95.
142 Id. at 93.
143 Id. at 94.
144 Id. at 89 (internal citation omitted).
145 Id. at 95–96.
146 Id. at 97.
147 Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)).
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In finding that the Second Amendment may elicit more
than one level of scrutiny due to the range of potential issues
affecting Second Amendment rights, the court concluded that a
less exacting standard than “[what] would have applied” to the
District of Columbia’s handgun ban was appropriate for the
present case.148 Absent a clear standard of review from the Heller
decision, the Third Circuit in Marzzarella adopted intermediate
scrutiny, and ultimately determined that the regulatory burden at
issue did not severely limit the lawful possession of firearms.149
Considering the right to self-defense and the public
safety concerns for restricting untraceable firearms due to
erased serial numbers, the Third Circuit importantly focused on
the operability of a firearm with or without a serial number.150
At the same time, the court carefully balanced its decision
concluding that, “Second Amendment doctrine remains in its
nascency, and lower courts must proceed deliberately when
addressing regulations unmentioned in Heller. Accordingly, we
hesitate to say Marzzarella’s possession of an unmarked firearm
in his home is unprotected conduct.”151 Under intermediate
scrutiny, however, the regulation was deemed sufficiently
tailored so as to not limit the possession of other lawful firearms,
and the court determined that there is no right to a gun with an
erased serial number for self-defense, even if the gun functions
the same with or without an identifiable serial number.152
Following Marzzarella’s adoption of a two-pronged test,
the Fourth Circuit vacated its initial opinion in United States v.
Chester, granting a panel rehearing to “provide district courts in
this Circuit guidance on the framework for deciding Second
Amendment challenges.”153 In addressing the presumptively
lawful regulations mentioned in Heller, the court noted that no
consensus regarding an appropriate level of scrutiny for
firearms had emerged, but that the Marzzarella two-prong
approach proved effective.154
The question presented in Chesterwas whether defendant
William Chester’s conviction for illegal possession of a firearm
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)—whichmade it illegal for anyone who
had been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 Id. at 93–95.
151 Id. at 101.
152 Id. at 100–01.
153 United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 2010).
154 Id. at 678–80 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626
(2008)) (citingMarzzarella, 614 F.3d, at 89).
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to be in possession of a firearm—violated his Second Amendment
rights in consideration of theHeller decision.155 The court held that,
because of Chester’s record as a domestic violence misdemeanant,
his assertion did not fall within the core right identified in Heller:
the right of a “law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry
a weapon for self-defense,” and therefore his claim was not
protected under the Second Amendment.156
The court dedicated a significant portion of its decision to
discussing Heller’s list of presumptively lawful regulatory
measures, specifically “the longstanding prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”157 Similar
to Marzzarella, the court in Chester was presented with a novel
issue not specifically addressed in Heller. For the first prong of
the Marzzarella test, the court had to decide whether the
prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons included
misdemeanants of domestic violence like Chester.158 Because the
scope of what Heller decided “is far from clear,” the court could
not conclude absolutely that such felons are not afforded Second
Amendment protections.159
Therefore, the court moved to the second prong and
endeavored to ascribe a level of scrutiny appropriate for
Chester’s case. In evaluating its options, the court noted that
strict scrutiny would be too broad because of the potential range
of different gun regulations.160 Because of Chester’s domestic-
violence history, the Fourth Circuit found that he was not the
sort of law-abiding citizen entitled to Second Amendment
protections under the Heller decision and its emphasis on self-
defense.161 The court concluded intermediate scrutiny would be
appropriate “for Chester and similarly situated persons,”
remanding the case so the district court could apply
intermediate scrutiny and determine whether the government
carried its burden of a regulatory measure that provided “‘a
reasonable fit’ . . . [to] a ‘substantial’ government objective.”162
On remand under this standard, the district court convicted
Chester, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.163 In dealing with a
155 Id. at 674.
156 Id. at 683 (emphasis in original) (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 634–35).
157 Id. at 677 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
158 Id. at 680.
159 Id.at 681 (quotingUnitedStates v.McCane, 573F.3d1037, 1048 (10thCir. 2009)).
160 Id. at 682.
161 Id. at 683 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 635).
162 Id. at 683 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, at 480 (1989)) (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97–98 (3rd Cir. 2010)).
163 SeeUnited States v. Chester, 847 F.Supp.2d 902 (S.D.W. Va. 2012), aff’d 514
F. App’x. 393 (4th Cir. 2013).
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question not fully explained by Heller, the Fourth Circuit
properly applied intermediate scrutiny as a means to balance
the substantial public safety concerns while protecting lawful
gun ownership.
B. Rejecting the “‘[L]evels of [S]crutiny’ Quagmire”164 and
Balancing Interests
In United States v. Skoien, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit took a different slant to a very similar issue as
presented in Chester. Defendant Steven Skoien had two prior
convictions for “misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence” and
challenged 18U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which forbade him from carrying
firearms, as a violation of his Second Amendment rights under
the Heller holding.165 As in Chester, the question presented
centered on whether Heller’s endorsement of prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons included repeat misdemeanor
offenses of domestic violence.166
The court found it futile to “parse these passages ofHeller
as if they contained an answer to whether § 922(g)(9) is valid,”
and warned district courts “not to treat Heller as containing
broader holdings than the Court set out to establish.”167 With
this preface, the Skoien court noted that statutory prohibitions
on some persons are proper, and focused on the legislative
history behind the statute, finding that Heller did not require
bans on the possession of firearms to reflect those that were in
place when the Bill of Rights was passed.168 While not
performing an explicit balancing test as suggested in Justice
Breyer’s Heller dissent, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the
government was required to show a strong justification for the
prohibition, but that the court would “not get more deeply into
the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire.”169 Pointing out that Skoien was
a recidivist, and finding that public safety concerns justified the
law, the court held that the statute did not violate the rights
guaranteed by the Second Amendment.170 While there is the
potential to use public safety justifications to uphold any firearm
164 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010).
165 See id. at 639 (quoting and citing 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(9) (2012)) (alteration
in original).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 640–41.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 641–42.
170 Id. at 644–45.
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regulation,171 the Seventh Circuit appropriately addressed the
specific facts of the case at issue, focusing on Skoien’s status as
a repeat offender of domestic violence and distinguishing the
regulation’s burden on lawful gun ownership.172
In Skoien, the Seventh Circuit declined to adopt a level of
scrutiny analysis because of what it deemed to be precautionary
language in Heller, and not a bright-line rule as to what the
Second Amendment protects.173 Because the “Justices have told
us that the matters have been left open,”174 the court deftly
declined to ascribe a standard of review. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit simply assessed the government interests of public
safety in regulating firearms alongside the vague exceptions in
Heller as applied to Skoien, and upheld the regulation.175
In response toMcDonald, the City of Chicago replaced its
laws prohibiting handgun possession with the Responsible Gun
Owners Ordinance, requiring firing-range training as a
precondition to lawful gun ownership, while also barring all
firing ranges in the city.176 In Ezell v. City of Chicago, plaintiffs
sought an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the new
ordinance, contending that a total ban on firing ranges was
unconstitutional as it effectively inhibited citizens’ core right to
self-defense by proscribing their ability to practice their
marksmanship within city limits.177 The city legislature passed
the ordinance intending it to be a reasonable response to limit
gun violence in light of the Heller andMcDonald decisions.178
In reversing the lower court’s decision to not grant the
injunction, the Seventh Circuit performed a two-part test
similar to the test utilized in Marzzarella.179 First, the court
decided that firing-range training did fall under the category of
rights protected by the Second Amendment because practice and
proficiency in the use of firearms are directly related to the self-
defense right recognized in Heller.180 Instead of defining a level
of scrutiny to perform the second stage of analysis, the court
performed a balancing test of the government’s justification and
the severity of the law’s burden.181 The Seventh Circuit strongly
171 See Lauren Dwarika, Analyzing Second Amendment Challenges: Getting
Strict with Judges Court of Appeals of New York, 31 TOURO L. REV. 723, 730–32 (2015).
172 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645.
173 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640–42.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 642.
176 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2011).
177 Id. at 689.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 690, 704.
180 Id. at 704.
181 Id. at 709–11.
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emphasized the regulation’s impact on the ability of law-abiding
citizens to effectively protect themselves and weighed it against
the justification of public safety.182
While not ascribing to a level of scrutiny, the court did
require a “form of strong showing” from the government in
connecting the means and ends of the law, and ultimately held
that, because the city could not demonstrate how civilian target
practice at firing ranges created genuine risks to public safety,
the ordinance violated the rights guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.183 The court remanded this case under the more
pragmatic approach of interest-balancing.184 The decision is a
prime example of how a more flexible methodology, absent a
defined level of scrutiny, does not mean that gun regulations will
always be insurmountably upheld.
In Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois, the
Seventh Circuit advanced its analysis of firearms regulations
further by completely disavowing a level of scrutiny analysis and
what it deemed as versions of intermediate scrutiny:
Instead of trying to decide what “level” of scrutiny applies, and how it
works, inquiries that do not resolve any concrete dispute, we think it
better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were common
at the time of ratification or those that have “some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia,” . . . and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means
of self-defense.185
In Friedman, the Seventh Circuit instituted this new test
when private gun owners and the Illinois State Rifle Association
challenged an ordinance that prohibited the possession of
assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines.186
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance as a
violation of their Second Amendment rights to bear arms for the
purposes of self-defense.187
While the key to the Heller holding is its emphasis on
self-defense, in Friedman the Seventh Circuit sought to
reconcile that right alongside the limitations on “dangerous and
unusual weapons” also mentioned in Heller.188 In holding that
prohibiting the possession, sale, or manufacture of semi-
182 Id. at 708–09.
183 Id. (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010)).
184 Id. at 711.
185 Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 622–25 (2008)) (internal citations omitted).
186 Id. at 407.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 407–08 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. 570, at 627).
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automatic assault weapons and large capacity magazines did not
violate the Second Amendment, the Seventh Circuit emphasized
that because the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed
the scope of the Second Amendment, much of the language in
Heller outside the core focus on the right of individuals to possess
a gun in the home for self-defense was precautionary, reflecting the
Court’s disposition rather than absolute law.189 The Seventh Circuit
declined to read more into Heller’s holding than explicitly stated.190
In doing this, the court provided a more effective test by focusing on
what is necessary to maintain a militia, as well as preserving
adequate means for self-defense for law-abiding citizens.191
The Friedman decision illustrates why courts should
utilize a more flexible approach to reviewing firearm regulations
than strict scrutiny while the scope of the Second Amendment
remains ill-defined. Importantly, this approach allows for the
democratic process to exercise its discretion in enacting
reasonable firearm regulations for the goal of public safety, as
opposed to judges creating law from the bench. In contrast to
individual judges attempting to explain or assess a law under
the stringent standards of strict scrutiny, “the best way to
evaluate the relation among assault weapons, crime, and self-
defense is through the political process and scholarly debate, not
by parsing ambiguous passages in the Supreme Court’s
opinions . . . [and] when there is no definitive constitutional
rule, matters are left to the legislative process.”192 There is no
definitive constitutional rule outside of the individual right to a
gun in the home for self-defense, and because issues involving
firearm regulations inherently involve public policy and a range
of personal opinions, the more flexible approach of intermediate
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is better suited to address
regulations influencing Second Amendment rights.
C. Jumping the Gun: The Arrival of Strict Scrutiny and Its
Subsequent Rejection
The legislative process in Maryland produced the FSA in
an effort to protect legal gun ownership, reduce the number of
gun-related deaths, and prevent criminals from obtaining
guns.193 The FSA prohibits the possession, purchase, sale, or
189 Id. at 409–10.
190 Id. at 410.
191 Id. at 411–12.
192 Id. at 412.
193 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 188 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d in part, vacated in
part en banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
464 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
transfer of semi-automatic assault rifles and makes it illegal to
have large capacity magazines (LCMs), or an ammunition
magazine with a capacity larger than ten rounds.194 In Kolbe v.
Hogan, the Fourth Circuit found that the FSA burdened the core
right of self-defense as expressed in Heller, remanding the case
and instructing the district court to apply strict scrutiny in its
review of the FSA.195
Plaintiff Stephen Kolbe owned a semi-automatic
handgun but sought to purchase a semi-automatic assault rifle
for home protection. He brought suit against the State of
Maryland for declaratory and injunctive relief.196 In granting
summary judgment to the state, the district court applied
intermediate scrutiny, finding that the FSA was a valid
regulation under the Second Amendment and furthered
Maryland’s goal of public safety.197
In deciding the subsequent appeal, the Fourth Circuit
expanded upon its holding in Chester, incorporating a two-part
test.198 Finding that the law did burden the individual right to a
gun under the Second Amendment, the court also raised the
issue of the specific type of weapon before moving to the test’s
second prong.199 The court determined that semi-automatic rifles
and LCM’s are commonly possessed by law-abiding individuals
and therefore not the sort of dangerous and unusual weapons
warned of in Heller.200 In addressing the FSA’s prohibition on
LCMs, the court acknowledged that there could be a capacity
that exceeded common use, but tellingly declined to answer what
the threshold would be.201 The decision also focused on the
operability of a gun and its need to have a functioning magazine
of ammunition, but this did not address the issue of how many
bullets in a magazine may be considered dangerous or
unusual.202 In focusing on operability as opposed to capacity, the
panel opinion ducked the issue of what truly would be excessive
and subject to greater regulation.
Moving to the second step in its analysis, the court then
sought to determine an appropriate standard of review for the
194 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 4–303(a), 4–305(b).
195 Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 181–82, 184.
196 Id. at 170–71.
197 Id. at 171.
198 Id. at 171–72.
199 Id. at 172–73.
200 Id. at 174.
201 Id. at 174–75.
202 Id. at 175 (“The Second Amendment protects ‘arms,’ ‘weapons,’ and
‘firearms’; it does not explicitly protect ammunition. Nevertheless, without bullets, the
right to bear arms would be meaningless.” (quoting Jackson v. City & Cty. of S.F., 746
F.3d 953, 967 (9th Cir.2014)).
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legislation, finding the FSA to be a substantial burden on the
fundamental right of self-defense, and decided that strict
scrutiny should apply.203 The Fourth Circuit’s discussion of semi-
automatic rifles as an effective instrument for self-defense
evinces the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in Heller. While
the Heller decision stressed the handgun as the “quintessential
self-defense weapon,” listing numerous reasons why they would
be preferred over other guns (e.g., easier to handle, store, etc.),204
in Kolbe the Fourth Circuit panel opinion provided a litany of
reasons why handguns are not preferable, such as inaccuracy.205
Moreover, the court went as far as to state that handguns are
difficult to handle—a complete retort to Justice Scalia’s
exhaustive list on the preferability of handguns in Heller.206
D. A Category of Weapons Beyond Second Amendment
Protection
In its subsequent en banc decision in Kolbe, the Fourth
Circuit reignited the discussion on what is necessary or
preferred for self-defense, further elucidating the chasm of
opinion as to this issue alongside public safety considerations.207
In approaching the FSA specifically, and the larger question of
an appropriate standard of review, the en banc decision cut
through the morass of issues raised by Heller, focusing on
Heller’s “clear and dispositive pronouncement” that “[t]here is no
Second Amendment protection for . . . ‘weapons that are most
useful in military service.’”208
While the initial Kolbe panel found that, due to their
common use, the semi-automatic weapons targeted by the FSA
were not dangerous and unusual,209 the en banc decision instead
focused extensively on their military features and purpose.210 It
revived Justice Breyer’s dissent in Heller, pointing out the
cyclical nature of the common use argument, and how in order
203 Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 175.
204 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
205 Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 181.
206 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 629 (“There are many reasons that a citizen may
prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily
accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker;
it is easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it
can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”), with
Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 181 (arguing that handguns are less accurate than rifles, and would
therefore be less preferable during the split second intensity of a home invasion).
207 Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 127–28 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting
Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
208 Id. at 142 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
209 Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 174.
210 Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 124–27, 142–43.
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for anything to be protected under this standard, a “new weapon
would need only be flooded on the market prior to any
governmental prohibition in order to ensure it constitutional
protection.”211 In this way, a plethora of missile launchers
dumped onto themarket could be considered protected under the
Second Amendment as being in common use due to the sheer
volume available.
In reference to the many open questions of the Heller
decision’s precise boundaries as to what is protected under the
Second Amendment, the en banc decision clarified the inquiry to
one ultimate question: “[a]re the banned assault weapons and
large-capacity magazines ‘like’ ‘M-16 rifles,’ i.e., ‘weapons that
are most useful in military service,’ and thus outside the ambit
of the Second Amendment?”212 By answering in the
affirmative,213 the en banc decision took a significant step in
developing Second Amendment jurisprudence by identifying a
category of arms that are not constitutionally protected.
The dialogue between these decisions in just one circuit
exhibits the range of opinions inherent in any discussion of gun
violence and firearm regulation, and the high-profile role such
issues have in society.214 Because there is such a significant
degree of debate over what types of weapons and what conduct
is protected under the Second Amendment, courts should decline
to adopt strict scrutiny for firearm regulations, and should not
view the Fourth Circuit’s experience in Kolbe as a starting point
for the development of strict scrutiny for firearm regulations.
When connected to the core right of self-defense recognized in
Heller, there is a vast array of opinions in terms of what weapons
people believe they need to protect themselves.215 Whether it be
a handgun or an assault rifle, it is debatable if “the prohibition
of semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines does not
effectively disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability
to defend themselves.”216 Maryland’s FSA was a policy product
of the democratic process in response to mass shootings,217 and,
as the Fourth Circuit ultimately decided, the more pragmatic
211 Id. at 141–42.
212 Id. at 136 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
213 Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627).
214 See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 183–84; District of Columbia v. Heller: One of the
Supreme Court’s most important Second Amendment decisions, supra note 49.
215 See B. Gil Horman, Choosing a Home-Defense Gun, NRA (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2015/10/16/choosing-a-home-defense-gun/
[https://perma.cc/DV3H-QFMQ].
216 Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 198 (King, R., dissenting) (quoting N.Y. State. Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.2d 242, 260 (2d Cir. 2015)).
217 Id. at 194.
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intermediate standard of review should be utilized in reconciling
Second Amendment rights with public safety.218
III. BACK TO THE FUTURE: RECONCILING THE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS WITH REASONABLE FIREARM REGULATION
Courts should employ intermediate scrutiny in reviewing
legislation impacting Second Amendment rights because of the
uncertainty of what types of weapons are protected under the
Second Amendment and the differences of opinion and approaches
to firearm regulations and self-defense. A strict scrutiny analysis
will disproportionately inhibit reasonable regulation aimed at
promoting public safety.
A. Clarifying the Heller Exceptions: What Is Common?
Much of the confusion over Second Amendment
jurisprudence arises from the indeterminate scope of the Heller
decision and a lack of clarity as to what the exceptions in Heller
mean.219 Justice Scalia defined the lawful prohibition against
“dangerous and unusual weapons” as those not in common use by
law-abiding citizens.220 Following this guidance, the Fourth Circuit
panel opinion in Kolbe compared the volume of semi-automatic
rifles to car sales in an effort to explain how such weapons are
commonly used for self-defense, and therefore not dangerous and
unusual.221 Reasonable minds can and do differ as to whether this
is an appropriate measure of what is common, indicating the need
for further guidance on what is common, and if that should even be
a standard for lawful regulatory measures.222
Instead of asking what is common, courts should decide
if the regulation at issue substantially burdens the effective
maintenance of a militia or the ability to protect one’s self at
home. Even if the result is a prohibition on a class of weapons,
as long as there is individual access to a handgun as commanded
by Heller,223 legislatures should be permitted to regulate
weapons considered a threat to public safety. Such regulation
should be permitted because Heller’s holding was premised on
218 See Sarah Perkins, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment
Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1096–97 (2010).
219 See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010); Larson,
supra note 40, at 1371–72.
220 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (quoting 4
BLACKSTONE 148–49 (1769)).
221 Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 174.
222 See Charles, supra note 106, at 1183.
223 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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the right of self-defense,224 and there is too great a range of
opinion as to what is necessary for this prerogative.225 Therefore
legislatures, not courts, should make these policy decisions, and
not be inhibited by the prospect of a reviewing court employing
strict scrutiny and striking down reasonable regulation. Under
this approach, the individual right to a handgun for self-defense
will not be obliterated and Heller’s holding can be reconciled
with reasonable regulation.
The common use test advanced by Heller is also
ineffectual because it ignores the current proliferation of
firearms, and fails to provide an accurate picture of what is
“common.” The idea of common use does not address whether the
focus should be on the number of owners of weapons or the
actual number of weapons.226 For example, does an individual
owner possessing multiple firearms make those weapons more
common in society in general? Or should the focus be on the
number of people who actually possess certain weapons?
Courts should abandon the common use test, employ an
interest-balancing approach under intermediate scrutiny, and
determine whether a weapon is most useful in military service. If
a court finds the weapon most useful in military service, it should
thus find that its possession by an individual separate from a
military context falls outside the Second Amendment’s scope. As
a practical effect of such analysis there will be a determination on
the strength of each side of the constitutional issue, with one
typically proving to be stronger.227 There are numerous examples
prior to the Heller decision of state constitutions incorporating
explicit individual right to bear arms provisions that were
reconciled with more deferential reasonable regulation standards
in cases challenging firearm regulations.228
B. The Right to Bear Arms Is Not Absolute: First
Amendment Comparisons and Categorical Exclusions
One possible solution is that courts evaluate Second
Amendment challenges using First Amendment jurisprudence.
Just as commercial speech is not protected as rigorously as
224 Id.
225 See Kolbe, 813 F.3d at 172–73; Horman, supra note 215.
226 See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 136 (4th Cir. 2017).
227 Heller, 554 U.S. at 690–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228 See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV.
683, 711 (2007) (explaining how courts in forty two states with constitutional provisions
protecting the individual right to bear arms employed a deferential “reasonable
regulation” standard as opposed to strict scrutiny or any form of heightened scrutiny).
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individual speech,229 so too can courts advance a similar approach
to firearm regulations. The First Amendment’s protection does
not extend to certain categories of speech, like “obscenity,
defamation, immediate incitement of crime,” etc.; similarly, limits
on the possession of firearms are acceptable and not restricted to
those acknowledged when the Bill of Rights was approved in
1791.230 Courts should recognize the out-of-home versus in-home
distinction highlighted by Heller’s acknowledgement of an
individual right to a handgun in the home for self-defense.
Justice Scalia recognized this analogy in the Heller
decision, when he described how, just like the First Amendment,
the Second Amendment’s protection is not unlimited.231 At the
same time, however, Justice Scalia resisted a case-by-case
analysis approach by describing the Second Amendment as the
product of an interest-balancing at the time it was drafted.232 But
this characterization as the product of interest-balancing when
the Second Amendment was adopted in 1791233 does not reflect
historical changes and how those interests have shifted over
time. And while the elevation of the individual right to a
handgun in the home “takes out of the hands of government—
even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on
a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting
upon,”234 because overall gun ownership is more widespread and
varied than handguns kept in a home for self-defense, a more
pragmatic approach is to treat firearm regulations on a case-by-
case basis. This approach is akin to the Court’s well-established
precedent that acknowledges the myriad of different speech
protected, or not, by the First Amendment.
A more variable and scaled approach to issues affecting
Second Amendment rights under intermediate scrutiny will be
more effective than a rigid one-size-fits all method to gun
regulations under a strict scrutiny analysis.235 Content-neutral
speech is subject to a form of intermediate scrutiny, while
political speech is protected under strict scrutiny.236 But because
229 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770–71 (1976).
230 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–69 (2010)).
231 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
232 See id. at 634–35.
233 U.S. CONST. amend II; The New United States of America Adopted the Bill
of Rights: December 15, 1791, AMERICA’S LIBRARY, http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/
nation/jb_nation_bofright_1.html [https://perma.cc/4887-R4P5].
234 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).
235 See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); Roy G.
Spece, Jr., & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285, 288 (2015).
236 Chester, 628 F.3d at 682.
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the scope of the Second Amendment is ill-defined,237 its language
is ambiguous, and the rights protected are not clear,238 strict
scrutiny should not automatically apply to all firearm
regulations. A regulation banning automatic rifles should not
mechanically be equated and scrutinized in the same manner as
laws affecting handgun possession. Intermediate scrutiny is
better suited to address gun control measures, as the standard
of review can balance interests behind the regulation, while
preserving the individual right to a handgun in the home.239
The comparison to varying degrees of protection under
the First Amendment is appropriate, and regulations outside of
the home should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. A
regulation outside the home should be given less judicial
deference than a law inhibiting the central right of self-defense
by law-abiding citizens in the home.240 Commercial speech receives
First Amendment protection if it involves “lawful activity” and is
not deceptive.241 If the contested speech falls within this sphere of
First Amendment protection, a court looks to the substantiality of
the government interest in regulating such speech, and asks
whether the regulation promotes that interest, and if the
regulation is limited to the interest it is meant to serve.242 Laws
regulating firearms outside of the home should be addressed in a
similar fashion. As long as there is individual access to a handgun
in the home, courts should weigh the substantial government
interest of public safety, ask if the regulation promotes this
interest, and then question whether there are other methods to
achieve the desired legislative intention.
The Heller decision resisted a case-by-case analysis,243
but also emphasized that Second Amendment rights are not
unlimited.244 Without clearly defining Second Amendment
limitations, the practical effect is that courts will end up
performing a case-by-case analysis,245 balancing the interests of
the government’s public safety concerns with the rights
protected under the Second Amendment. Strict scrutiny is too
restrictive on the government’s compelling interest of public
237 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011).
238 See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).
239 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
240 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 181–82 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d in part, vacated
in part en banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
241 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
242 Id.
243 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
244 Id. at 626.
245 Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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safety,246 while intermediate scrutiny is more appropriate for
weighing that interest with the limited scope of the Second
Amendment right to a handgun in the home for self-defense.
Similar to distinctions drawn between commercial and non-
commercial speech in the First Amendment context,247 a case-by-
case analysis can be utilized in addressing the personal right to
a gun in the home and limitations on the right to a gun outside
the home, with more latitude given to those regulations focused
outside the home. Strict scrutiny will compromise the analysis
of the government’s public safety interests,248 and because
Second Amendment jurisprudence is still developing and the
scope of the right is not exactly clear,249 courts should employ a
balancing of interests under intermediate scrutiny.
C. The Democratic Process and the Implausibility of
Amending the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”250 Heller
highlighted the vast range of opinion as to what the language of
the Second Amendment means, with petitioners arguing that it
protected possession of firearms solely in connection with militia
service, and respondents claiming an individual right to a gun—
distinct from militia service.251 In agreeing with the latter, the
Heller decision split the language of the Second Amendment into
two parts: the operative and prefatory clauses.252 Justice Scalia
skillfully connected the prefatory clause, “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,” with the
operative clause, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed,” as stating a purpose and a command for
the Amendment as a whole.253 In dissecting the historical
understanding of bearing arms and its meaning in state
constitutions throughout U.S. history, theHeller decision codified
the language of the Second Amendment as an individual right for
the purpose of self-defense and the maintenance of a militia.254
246 Id.
247 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2011).
248 Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
249 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 101 (3rd Cir. 2010).
250 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
251 Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 577–78 (quoting J. TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394 (1867)).
254 Id. at 598–602.
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This understanding is still greatly contested with many
people believing steadfastly that the language of the Second
Amendment only pertains to the maintenance of a militia as a
collective right, as opposed to an individual right.255 But in light
of Heller, it is necessary for gun control advocates to accept that
there is an individual right to a gun256—at least a handgun—for
defense of home. To clarify the scope of the Second Amendment
and the exceptions Heller espoused, Congress could modify the
Second Amendment to include, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms in defense of home, shall not be infringed.”
Because Heller only acknowledged a handgun in the
home for self-defense, this modification would both satisfy
Heller’s holding as well as allow for constitutionally permissible
firearm regulations outside the home. It is debatable what is
necessary for home defense, and because Heller focused on
handgun possession, the judicial deliberation should end there. If
legislatures seek to enact firearm legislation regulating certain
weapons outside of the scope of handguns in the home, they
should be able to do so. Heller stated that it did “not clarify the
entire field” of Second Amendment jurisprudence,257 and Congress
should attempt that initiative by defining the Second Amendment
as a private right to self-defense in the home. With this
clarification of the Second Amendment’s purpose, legislatures will
be better able to draft reasonable regulation that balances defense
of home with overall public safety concerns.
The Constitution was written to be a firm basis of law for
the United States, but also with the understanding that it be
amenable to change through the democratic process so as to
avoid violent conflict.258 The procedure for changing the
Constitution, however, is extremely difficult, with any alteration
requiring substantial majorities in both houses of Congress or
conventions of three-quarters of the states.259 Because of the
highly debatable nature of the Second Amendment, and the
rigorous process of amending the Constitution, a rewriting of the
255 See id. at 679–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also French, supra note 2;
Samuels, supra note 2.
256 Zimmer, supra note 64, at 220–21.
257 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
258 Mary Frances Berry, AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION; How Hard It Is To
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Second Amendment is likely not politically feasible.260 In the
absence of such amodification clarifying the Second Amendment
as a private right based on self-defense of the home, courts
should not employ strict scrutiny in addressing firearm
regulations because the goal of public safety will be
disproportionately inhibited by the ambiguous scope of an
individual right to bear arms.261
Deference to legislatures in enacting reasonable gun
regulation should outweigh judicial intervention in addressing
the scope of the Second Amendment, and the uniform adoption
of strict scrutiny for firearm regulations will frustrate this purpose.
There are strong regional differences regarding firearm regulations
for the goal of public safety, and a strict scrutiny approach does not
respect reasonable legislative decisions262—in most instances
strongly supported by the public.263 It is clear that the constitutional
right to a handgun in the home is fundamental.264 Outside of that
immediate right, however, the Second Amendment’s boundaries are
not certain.265 As long as there is a self-defense component to the
analysis, and until Congress or the Supreme Court clearly defines
the scope of the constitutional right, courts should not uniformly
adopt strict scrutiny.
Friedman and Kolbe provide prime examples of these
regional differences. Both cases involved restrictions on semi-
automatic rifles, but the Kolbe court initially remanded the case
with instructions to use strict scrutiny, while the Friedman
court upheld the restriction as a constitutionally permissible
regulation.266 If the Fourth Circuit had not issued its subsequent
en banc decision rejecting strict scrutiny, the FSA may have
potentially been struck down under that standard of review.
With the absence of clarity from Heller, and the potential
development of strict scrutiny for firearm regulations,
restrictions such as those upheld in Friedman, and other future
260 Zachary Elkins, Rewrite the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/05/opinion/rewrite-the-second-amendment.html [https://pe
rma.cc/MVN7-E5GW].
261 Heller, 554 U.S. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
262 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 902 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
263 See generally Carl Bialik, Most Americans Agree With Obama That More
Gun Buyers Should Get Background Checks, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 5, 2016, 8:25 AM),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/most-americans-agree-with-obama-that-more-gun-
buyers-should-get-background-checks/ [https://perma.cc/768C-D5LH]; Elkins, supra
note 260.
264 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767.
265 See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 2010).
266 See discussion supra Sections II.B–C.
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regulations, may not survive.267 The Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari and thus did not hear Friedman,
and the dissent in the initial Kolbe panel opinion emphasized
this in arguing against explicitly adopting strict scrutiny,
pointing to the lack of clarity as to Second Amendment rights
and the fact that no other circuit court took it upon themselves
to employ strict scrutiny to firearm regulations.268
Strict scrutiny should not be adopted under the vague
shadow of what is and is not permissible under the Second
Amendment, and courts should not be making these decisions
under the rigid guidelines of strict scrutiny. While protecting the
right to a handgun in the home, legislatures should be
responsible for making policy decisions on regulating firearms
in general, and the adoption of strict scrutiny threatens the
survival of future regulatory schemes.269
Due to the political impracticality of modifying the
Second Amendment,270 and short of a congressional action
clarifying Second Amendment rights, the important arena for
development of Second Amendment doctrine is the states. Local
laws and initiatives to either restrict or expand Second
Amendment rights are where change is likely to be seen. States’
legislatures are the playing ground for the future development of
SecondAmendment doctrine.271New regulations, and challenges to
those regulations, will work their way through the courts, building
the framework for constitutionally permissible firearm laws. Strict
scrutiny threatens the development of these state initiatives and
the survival of reasonable regulation. Because the scope of the
Second Amendment is ambiguous, courts should apply
intermediate scrutiny as opposed to strict scrutiny in addressing
future state initiatives on firearm regulations.
CONCLUSION
Courts should not apply strict scrutiny to firearm
regulations and must not view the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
Kolbe v. Hogan as an initial step toward the adoption of strict
scrutiny. Because the scope of the Second Amendment right is not
clearly defined and open to a drastic range of interpretations,
267 Henderson, supra note 91, at 465.
268 Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 195–96 (4th Cir. 2016) (King, J., dissenting),
aff’d in part, vacated in part en banc 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017).
269 Henderson, supra note 91, at 465.
270 Elkins, supra note 260.
271 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.”).
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courts should employ intermediate scrutiny. Since Congressional
modification and explanation of the Second Amendment is not
likely, the Supreme Court must clarify the specific rights
guaranteed by the Second Amendment, incorporating Heller’s
acknowledgement of the individual right to a handgun in the
home, while explaining what is subject to government regulation
beyond that immediate right. The maintenance of a militia, the
individual right to a handgun for self-defense, and reasonable
regulation can all be reconciled under intermediate scrutiny.
The fate of reasonable regulation is uncertain under a strict
scrutiny standard of review because of the range of opinions as
to what is necessary for self-defense and the ambiguous scope of
the Second Amendment. Until the Supreme Court clarifies the
scope of the Second Amendment and the appropriate standard
of review, courts should view Kolbe v. Hogan as a warning
against strict scrutiny, not an invitation for its application to
firearm regulations.272
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